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Projektissa tutkittiin tietoturva- ja optimointi -asetusten toteuttamista Cybergame-sovellukseen, 
joka on pelillistetty kyberturvallisuuden opetusalusta. Projektissa hyödynnetyt ADC-
ominaisuudet toteutettiin F5 BIG-IP ADC-laitteilla, jotka olivat projektin olennaisimmat 
verkkolaitteet. Koska Cybergame-sovellus ei ollut valmis projektin aikana, testauksia varten 
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Abstract  
 
The aim of this project was to create a ready framework for a web application called 
Cybergame by implementing secure and optimized application delivery features. The 
application was not ready at the time of the project, so the implementations studied in the 
project were to be documented well for possible future projects. 
 
In the project, the implementation of security and optimization features for an application called 
Cybergame, a cyber security teaching platform that makes use of gamification, were studied. 
The features used in the project were provided by F5 BIG-IP application delivery controllers, 
which were the main web devices in the project. As the Cybergame application was not ready 
at the time of the project, a WordPress testing application had to be created and used. Kali 
GNU/Linux distribution was also utilized for the penetration testing tools to test some of the 
implementations. 
 
The security features such as the application security policy, the anomaly based DoS 
protection, the brute force block and some smaller application security features were 
configured. The optimization part consisted of the configuration of optimized TCP profiles and 
TCP multiplexing, HTTP Compression and Web Acceleration. The project also included the 
configuration of some basic ADC features and creation of required virtual machines 
 
The objectives for the project were accomplished as a secure and optimized framework for the 
Cybergame was created. Several features were covered, but most of the features could not be 
studied thoroughly. That leaves room for the possible future projects related to the Cybergame 
ADCs. The documentation created in the project can be used in future when implementing the  
features into the finished Cybergame application. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this project work was to study and implement the secure 
application delivery features of F5 BIG-IP ADC for an application called 
Cybergame, that will be explained more in detail in the next chapter. The 
Cybergame application was not complete at the time of the project, but a 
secure framework should be ready for the application once it is released. 
Some optimization features should also be implemented to increase the 
performance of the Cybergame. The features used in the project should all be 
documented and tested so that they can be implemented later to the 
Cybergame application.  
The F5 BIG-IP devices that would provide the used features were located in 
CyberLab of the South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences. The 
ADCs and some configurations had already been implemented into the 
CyberLab in previous projects. The configurations were tested by using tools 
found in Kali GNU/Linux distribution to find out the possible vulnerabilities and 
mitigations. A WordPress testing site would serve as a testing application 
since the Cybergame application was not available at the time of the project. 
Some work related to the ADCs was already done in the CyberLab earlier. 
The devices were implemented into the CyberLab and some basic settings 
were configured in the thesis work of Antti Peltonen in early 2016 (Peltonen 
2016). Later in 2016 Henri Kajova created a virtual laboratory, which makes 
use of the virtual versions of the BIG-IP. The thesis also covers some security 
configurations such as SSL offloading and DoS mitigation iRules. The virtual 
lab made by Kajova was also used in this project to get to know the BIG-IP 
devices. (Kajova 2016.) 
 
2 CYBERGAME 
A project called ”Cyber Security Expertise and Business Development” was 
started in May of 2015 in co-operation with KyUAS, LUT and Cursor Oy. The 
goal of the project was to create a hub called “CyberPros Academy” for the 
development of cyber security, piloting of cyber security services and studying 
of cyber threats and challenges. An innovation platform called “CyberLab” was 
to be built. The operating environment of CyberPros Academy hub includes a 
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modern data center and a cyber security training class. The data center also 
known as CyberLab can be used to do penetration tests and vulnerability 
scans for example. (Rouhiainen & Kettunen 2015.) 
The project is an innovative way to combine data center, gamification and 
cyber security expertise and research. The present deficit of skilled personnel 
in these areas is meant to be covered by creating a new research, knowledge, 
and innovation hub, which at the same time creates entrepreneurship and jobs 
in to the area. The cyber security expertise is delivered to a large crowd via a 
cyber security game. (Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö 2014.) 
The Cybergame is programmed in co-operation by the programming students 
of KyUAS and GoodLife Technologies company (Rouhiainen & Kettunen 
2015). The game is going to be located in the CyberLab data center. It will 
consist of a virtualized KVM hypervisor platform called NEST, which contains 
all the virtual machines that are used in the Cybergame. Clientless remote 
desktop gateway called Guacamole is used to access the virtual machines. 
The back-end server will be running game features such as game logic and 
databases. The NEST and the backend are running on a VMware ESXi 
hypervisor. The front-end servers work as an interface into the Internet. All the 
traffic into the Cybergame network goes first through the Cybergame BIG-IP 
ADC. The ADC will handle web security, Denial-of-Service protection and SSL 
offloading. The second levels of network security are provided by the North-
South Firewall. The basic design of the Cybergame network can be seen in 
figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Cybergame network basic design. 
 
3 APPLICATION DELIVERY CONTROLLER 
Last decade the need for legacy load balancers to handle more advanced 
application related requirements increased, which started making ADCs 
popular. The purpose of an ADC is to increase the performance, security and 
availability of the web delivered applications. (Citrix 2016.) The application 
delivery controller is usually placed in the DMZ zone of a network, which 
typically locates between the firewall or the router and the application servers. 
An ADC helps sites to remove excess load from the servers by directing user 
traffic from multiple servers. On top of Layer 4 load balancing, ADCs can 
operate layer 7 for content switching and offload certain CPU-intensive tasks 
from the servers. (KEMP 2016.) The latest generations of ADCs can handle a 
large variety of additional functions such as rate shaping and serving as a web 
application firewall (F5 2016b). 
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3.1 ADC features 
ADCs usually come in redundant High Availability configurations, which 
means that there are two devices of which one is an active device and another 
is in a standby. In case of failure in the active device, the standby device can 
become the new active device without any downtime. (KEMP 2016.)  
Load balancing helps server cluster to distribute traffic to optimize utilization, 
and to increase the availability and responsiveness of the servers (Citrix 
2016). There are many different Layer 4 IP-based methods provided by ADCs 
for distributing user traffic to servers. These Layer 4 methods can include 
Round Robin and Least Connection with Weighted versions of the two, 
Chained Failover with Fixed Weighting, and Server-Resource-Based load 
balancing. Weighting allows administrators to have better control of the traffic 
distribution. For example, if a higher performance server is added to the load 
balancing it can be appointed with a higher “weight”, so a larger amount of 
traffic will be allowed for it to handle. Layer 4 load balancing is sufficient for 
lower volumes of Internet traffic, but sometimes a more fine-tuned approach to 
the traffic distribution is needed. The fine-tuned approach can only be 
accomplished with Layer 7 content switching and other higher level load 
balancing methods. Content switching means the ability to load balance Layer 
7 payload based user requests to the servers. For example, an URL with 
images may be pointed to a graphics server and shop can point to a 
transaction server. This provides more application flexibility and greater 
performance tuning. (KEMP 2016.) ADCs can also perform global server load 
balancing, which means the redirecting of traffic to a server cluster placed in 
another data center (Citrix 2016). 
Application performance can be improved by many functions on an ADC, 
especially over mobile and high latency networks. ADCs can offload server 
intensive tasks, perform multiplexing, compression, and caching of high used 
static content. (Citrix 2016.) SSL offloading, for example, can be used to 
reduce the CPU usage of the application servers. By moving the SSL 
termination point to the ADC, the application servers are relieved from the 
CPU-heavy tasks of encrypting and decrypting traffic and setting up secured 
network connections, which greatly reduces the resources required by the 
application. (A10 2016.)  
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TCP multiplexing is another good way to improve the performance of 
applications. TCP multiplexing enables the device to reuse existing TCP 
connections, which removes the need for servers to open and close numerous 
TCP connections per second. TCP multiplexing improves the performance of 
the server and increases the capacity allowing the server to open more TCP 
connections for more users. (MacVittie 2008.) 
HTTP compression and caching can both be used to reduce the load of the 
application servers. The number of HTTP object data transferred can be 
decreased with HTTP compression by utilizing GNU zip compression, which is 
available in every modern browser. The network bandwidth usage can be 
reduced without corruption of the content, which improves users’ overall 
experience. If the task is offloaded to an ADC, it also saves the servers from 
the CPU-intensive task. Caching allows ADCs to store data from the servers 
in cache memory and deliver it quickly to the clients. This combined with 
HTTP compression means the ability to deliver pre-compressed data form the 
cache, rather than retrieving it from the servers every time. Caching can 
reduce the response times and boost transaction rates while freeing the 
servers to do other work. (KEMP 2016.) 
Web security is an important feature of ADCs. The ADCs can recognize DDoS 
attacks and implement rate limiting measures such as throttling or rejecting 
the requests from a DDoS attack. They can also learn to detect malicious 
requests by analyzing the traffic to determine patterns for normal behavior. As 
ADCs, have converged load balancing and advanced layer 7 protection the 
application firewalls can even inspect packets for suspicious or malicious 
content. (Citrix 2016.) Typical network layer attacks such as flood attacks and 
connections per second overloading attacks can be easily defeated with 
features such as the full proxy architecture, purpose built hardware for the 
mitigation of DoS. Protocol validation is also used against invalid data and 
asymmetric attacks. (Holmes 2013.) 
 
3.2 F5 Networks 
F5 Networks is a US-based company headquartered in Seattle, Washington. 
F5 Networks specializes in application delivery networking. Its main product is 
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the BIG-IP application delivery controller. (Crunchbase 2016.) F5 Networks 
was the market share leader in application delivery controllers with a 47% 
market share of the $2 billion market in 2015. Its largest competitors are Citrix, 
Radware and A10 Networks. (Lerner, Skorupa & Ciscato 2016.) 
 
3.3 F5 BIG-IP 
BIG-IP is a term for the compilation of hardware and software found in the 
ADC device made by F5. There is also a virtual edition available of the BIG-IP. 
The primary hardware components of the BIG-IP are Traffic Management 
Microkernel, Host Management Subsystem and Always On Management. The 
TMM includes several traffic processing hardware components such as a 
layer 2 switch module, dedicated SSL encryption or FIPS hardware and 
dedicated compression hardware. The HMS is responsible for system 
management and administration functions and runs a version of CentOS 
Linux. The HMS and the TMM share a single CPU and RAM memory. The 
AOM provides additional management of the HMS via a management 
processor and supporting functions for the TMM. The primary software 
components of the BIG-IP are also known as the Traffic Management 
Operating System or TMOS. Even though the TMOS name suggests that it is 
an operating system, it is a collection of firmware and operating systems, 
which run on BIG-IP and BIG-IP Virtual Edition. The TMOS includes TMM, 
HMS, AOM, MOS, EUD and feature modules like LTM. All the hardware 
components have software counterparts and have the same abbreviations. 
The TMM controls communications to and from the HMS. The LTM, iRules 
and other similar modules run within the TMM. The HMS runs a modified 
version of CentOS operating system and provides access to various 
management tools and interfaces such as the GUI configuration utility and an 
advanced shell. The AOM allows “lights out” power management and console 
access to the HMS. The MOS which is installed in an additional boot location 
is used for disk and file system maintenance. The EUD is a program that is 
used to perform BIG-IP hardware tests. (Jönsson & Iveson 2014, 21-25.) 
F5 BIG-IP also includes a feature called iRules, which is based on the F5’s 
exclusive TMOS architecture. An iRule is a user created TCL program or 
script that is assigned to a virtual server in the BIG-IP. The scripts are run or 
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triggered by a user or users doing events specified in the iRule. iRules can 
contain any number of commands and they can be programmed to do almost 
anything between the OSI layers 2 and 7, which leads to a great power and 
control over the network. (Iveson 2013, 18.) 
All BIG-IP versions come default with either a Local Traffic Manager module 
or a BIG-IP DNS module, which has been known as Global Traffic Manager in 
the past. They both provide core functionalities for BIG-IP. Other modules can 
be activated on demand when a need for the feature is recognized, allowing 
customization of the BIG-IP. There are total of 13 modules available of which 
10 are advanced BIG-IP feature modules and 3 feature modules for service 
providers. (F5 2016c.) There are two security modules available. Application 
Security Manager that protects web applications from attacks and the 
Advanced Firewall Manager, which is used to prevent network, SIP and DNS 
attacks (F5 2014b). In regards of application optimization, there is one 
important module, which is called Application Acceleration Manager (F5 
2014a). 
ASM is a web application firewall that secures web applications and protects 
them against vulnerabilities. The ASM can be used to develop different levels 
of security on layer 7. For example, The ASM can develop a security policy 
automatically based on the traffic patterns of the site. The policy can also be 
created manually or with a vulnerability assessment services. The security 
policies can protect web applications against many application layer threats 
such as SQL injection, buffer overflows, cross site scripting, cookie poisoning 
and many more. The ASM module can even protect the web infrastructure 
against layer 7 Denial-of-Service and zero-day threats. The ASM module also 
uses attack signatures to protect applications. By default, the BIG-IP ASM 
provides over two thousand signatures and more can be created manually. 
The signatures can detect different types of attacks against commonly used 
databases, applications and operating systems. (F5 2014b.) The ASM can 
also be used to detect DoS attacks using transaction based detection or 
latency based detection or both. The values of which the device uses to make 
the calculations can be changed manually. In the transaction based method, 
the average amount of requests per second to a certain URL or IP address is 
used. The latency based method uses the time the server takes to respond to 
the requests.  If any of the intervals go beyond the selected percentage set in 
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the DoS profile the ASM considers the system to be under attack. (F5 2013.) 
The IP intelligence feature of the ASM module also offers the ability to block 
connections based on their IP-address’ geolocations or just their reputation 
around the Internet. The Data Guard can be used to block sensitive 
information such as credit card or social security numbers automatically from 
being displayed in a web browser. (Wagnon 2013.)  
Advanced Firewall Manager, AFM is a module for F5 BIG-IP that offers 
defense against threats to network layers 3 and 4. The BIG-IP AFM module is 
a high-performance, stateful, full-proxy network security solution built 
especially for defeating high-capacity DDoS attacks against networks and 
network devices. The AFM can automatically mitigate the attacks, alert about 
an attack and adjust DDoS thresholds as traffic patterns change. The AFM 
includes high-volume logging controls to log the incoming traffic during a 
DDoS attack without it getting overwhelmed. IP-address blacklisting can also 
be enforced by reputation feeds offered by F5 networks and third parties. SSH 
and SSL connections are also controlled by the AFM. It can protect the SSH 
channel against data breaches and application attacks and inspect SSL 
sessions to terminate the connections of encrypted attacks. As most of the F5 
feature modules the AFM can be combined with iRules to extend the ability to 
mitigate attacks and increase its functionality. (F5 2016a.) 
Application Acceleration Manager is the main module for optimization features 
in the BIG-IP. With the native TMOS architecture, AAM makes it possible that 
web performance and WAN optimization can be combined with application 
delivery. The integration allows the enabling of technologies such as SSL 
offloading, HTTP compression, Web Acceleration and rate shaping. As other 
modules, the AAM can be combined with iRules. The AAM can also be used 
to optimize multitude of protocols delivered to heaps of different devices. (F5 
2014a.) 
 
4 WEB APPLICATION SECURITY 
Web application security means the process of protecting websites and 
services against security threats that exploit vulnerabilities in the code of the 
application. Web applications are high-priority targets for attackers, because 
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of complex source codes that increase the likelihood of vulnerabilities and 
code manipulation, ”high rewards” and the ease of execution as most attacks 
can be done automatically against many targets at a time. (Imperva 2017.)  
Typical web application vulnerabilities include injection type attacks such as 
SQL injections, cross-site scripting, remote file inclusion and cross-site 
request forgery (Imperva 2017). The current trend in application security risks 
can be observed from lists such as the OWASP top 10 list. The list describes 
the current TOP 10 risks of application security. However, the attacks don’t 
end at the top 10 and there are many more application security risks. 
(OWASP 2013.)  
 
4.1 Denial of Service 
Denial of Service attacks are a powerful way to disrupt and deny availability of 
web services. DoS attacks are essentially done by flooding the target of the 
attack with a very large amount of legitimate traffic to render it inaccessible to 
other users. DoS attacks with multiple attackers are called Distributed Denial 
of Service attacks or DDoS. (Shakarian, Shakarian & Ruef 2013, 12-13.)  
DoS attacks have moved up the OSI model starting from the network layer 
attacks from the early 90s into session attacks and then into application layer 
attacks. Network layer attacks are typically different flood type attacks. 
Session and presentation layers are attacked in session attacks, which consist 
of SSL and DNS attacks. Almost half of all the present attacks are done on the 
application layer. The detection of attacks becomes harder as the attacks go 
higher in the OSI model. (Holmes 2013.) 
The network layer attacks are the traditional way of DDoS attacks. The 
purpose of the network layer attacks is to consume the bandwidth of the target 
and deny the service for users. These attacks include for example, ICMP 
flooding, SYN flooding and UDP flooding. These kinds of attacks are easy to 
mitigate nowadays and for this reason the attackers have started to move to 
other types of attacks. (Balandin, Andreev & Koucheryavy 2015, 275.) Against 
the most common network layer attack, the SYN flood, there are three 
different types of mitigation methods. Two of them are found on the typical 
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network devices and servers and the third option, the use of SYN cookies is 
the best method and is found only on BIG-IP ADCs. (Holmes 2013.) 
Session layer attacks use the OSI layers 5 and 6. They include attacks 
against SSL and DNS. With common firewalls, SSL attacks cannot be 
mitigated and the ability to defend against DNS attacks is limited. For both 
attacks the best defense is a high-performance, full-proxy functionality that 
can validate every DNS and SSL connection going through. Typical Session 
layer attacks against DNS servers include attacks such as DNS query floods 
and DNS NXDOMAIN floods, in which the attacker sends nonexistent records 
to the server and wastes the server’s resources. Against the SSL there are 
SSL floods and SSL renegotiation attacks. In the SSL flood attacks the 
attacker sends malicious or empty SSL connections to the server to exhaust 
its resources. The SSL renegotiation attacks exploit the asymmetric 
encryption ability of SSL. The SSL handshake requires 10 times more 
processing power on the server side than the client side, which means that in 
the worst case only one client is needed for the denial of service. (Holmes 
2013.) 
Application layer DDoS attacks, also known as layer 7 DDoS attacks are 
denial of service attacks where the attacker targets the application OSI layer. 
The attacks over use certain features and functions on a site to disturb or 
disable them. The application layer attacks are different from other types of 
attacks. (Kiyuna, Conyers 2015, 24.) Application layer attacks, unlike the 
network layer based DDoS attacks, can focus on draining other resources 
such as Sockets, CPU, memory or disk or I/O bandwidth instead of only 
exhausting the bandwidth (Balandin, Andreev & Koucheryavy 2015, 275). 
They can also be performed by using legitimate protocols and legitimate 
connections so signature based detection systems cannot detect them. The 
application DDoS attacks may also encrypt the data of the connections in the 
application layer, which makes the attackers hard to detect without violating 
their privacy. Anomaly-based detection is currently the best solution for the 
detection and prevention of application layer attacks. Anomaly based 
detection is based on typical user behavioral patterns and also allows the 
detection of, zero-day attacks. HTTP protocol attacks are the most popular on 
the application layer due to the popularity of the protocol and the amount of 
vulnerabilities it has. (Galinina, Balandin & Koucheryavy, 2016, 327) 
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Typical application layer attacks types include attacks, such as simple or 
recursive GET floods, POST floods, low bandwidth HTTP Attacks, Slow POST 
attacks and HasHDoS attacks. GET floods, which are one of the most popular 
application layer attacks request a static object or every object on a page that 
can be requested. POST floods work the same way as GET floods, but 
instead of a GET request, they send a POST that has a greater chance of 
using up the resources on the target server. Low bandwidth HTTP attacks 
such as the SlowLoris are hard to detect by regular means because they use 
a very low amount of bandwidth. SlowLoris and similar tools first learn the 
target’s inactivity timeout timer and start feeding HTTP headers to the target in 
a very slow speed. A second before the timeout the SlowLoris sends a fake 
header to the server to keep the connection open. When the server has too 
many connections to open any new ones, the denial of service is achieved. 
Slow POST attacks work the same way as the SlowLoris, but instead of 
sending headers it starts an HTTP POST with the target and uploads data 
very slowly. HashDoS attacks work by sending a single POST message, 
which includes thousands of different variables to overwhelm the hashing 
function of the server. A single HashDoS POST message can disable a server 
for over an hour. (Holmes 2013.) 
 
4.2 Web scraping bots 
A Bot is an automated software program that runs tasks in the Internet. 
Typical bots perform simple, repetitive tasks at very high speeds. Almost half 
of all web traffic comes from bots and two thirds of the bot traffic is malicious. 
One of the ways that bots can cause harm to a site or an application is web 
scraping. Web scraping means the process of automatically collecting 
information from the Internet. The most common type of scraping aims to steal 
content from the web to use it elsewhere, which is called site scraping. The 
web scraping bots typically crawl the website and access the source code, 
parse it and remove the pieces they want and then post the content elsewhere 
on the Internet. Another, more advanced type of web scraping is the database 
scraping. It works like the site scraping bot, except it will ask the application to 
retrieve data from the database. (Saeed 2016.) 
 17 
 
4.3 Brute force 
Password-guessing attacks, also known as brute-force attacks are a common 
threat against web sites that require some kind of a user authentication. Trying 
every possible combination of characters systematically, until the right 
combination is called a brute force attack. A password can always be 
discovered by a brute force attack, but it can take a lot of time to find it out. 
The time to crack a password depends on its complexity. Brute-force attacks 
can also use dictionary words or slightly modified versions of dictionary words 
rather than random characters, because most people use dictionary based 
passwords. Brute-force attacks put user accounts into a risk and increase the 
site’s traffic with unnecessary transactions. There are many tools for the brute-
force attacks and most of them can utilize wordlists and proxy servers to try 
passwords from different IP-address with advanced rulesets. (OWASP 2016). 
 
5 KALI GNU/LINUX 
Kali Linux is a GNU/Linux distribution based on the Debian GNU/Linux 
distribution, which was first released in 2013. Kali focuses primarily on 
penetration testing and security auditing. By default, Kali contains hundreds of 
different tools for various information security tasks. Kali distribution was 
developed and funded by an information security company Offensive Security. 
(Offensive Security 2017b.) 
The minimum system requirements for Kali are 8GB of hard disk space, 
512MB of RAM memory and an Internet connection. Kali Linux can be 
downloaded and installed in a few different ways. The basic ISO image is 
available as 32-bit and 64-bit versions which can be installed via a CD or an 
USB. There is also a VM version of Kali for Virtual usage with ready installed 
VMware tools. Kali can also be running as a live CD, but it is not 
recommended as nothing can be saved. (Offensive Security 2017a.) 
 
6 IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation part includes the implementation and testing of security 
and optimization features offered by the BIG-IP ADC. The implementations 
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covered in this section should all be usable with the Cybergame application 
although some of the implementations need to be reconfigured or tweaked a 
bit when the Cybergame application is released. Some of the implementations 
were done to the test application located in www.cybergame.fi, which was at 
the time not available in the public Internet. To test most of the features a 
testing application with more features was required.  
 
6.1 Basic configuration 
At the start of the project, the ADCs had already been implemented into the 
CyberLab and some configurations had been made in previous thesis and 
project works (Kajova 2016; Peltonen 2016). The ADCs could be connected 
by local IP addresses 172.18.2.25 and 172.18.2.26. The required feature 
modules such as the ASM were installed and licensed. The VLANs, load 
balancing pools, nodes and the virtual servers for the required servers in the 
Cybergame had already been implemented so it was possible to access the 
Cybergame network through the ADC. The ADCs were set to an 
active/standby failover mode and the devices were in sync. The right 
certificates for the Cybergame.fi domain were added to the SSL profile in the 
ADC. The SSL was offloaded from the Cybergame servers into the ADC’s 
HTTPS virtual server for the cybergame.fi site.  
Even though the basic configuration had already been implemented into the 
ADC, some changes to the base configuration needed to be made. The first 
problem that appeared was that it was only possible to connect to 
https://www.cybergame.fi, the non-secure http://www.cybergame.fi could not 
be accessed and no automatic redirection to the HTTPS was made. This type 
of implementation could cause unnecessary confusion in the future. A new 
virtual server for the HTTP traffic and HTTP to HTTPS redirection had to be 
created. 
A new virtual server was created by going to the virtual server part of the 
menu in the ADC’s web interface, which was found under the Local Traffic 
module and then clicking the create new button. The settings for the virtual 
server were copied from the HTTPS version of the virtual server, except of the 
port number, which in this case was 80 instead of 443 and the load balancing 
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address pool, which was left blank. The BIG-IP system default iRule called 
“_sys_https_redirect” was added to the new virtual server by going to the 
virtual server tab and clicking the resources button on the newly created 
virtual server. After implementing the iRule, traffic to the 
http://www.cybergame.fi was automatically redirected to 
https://www.cybergame.fi.  
Another issue related to the basic configuration was that for some reason the 
clock settings of the devices were not in sync and the logging was behaving 
incorrectly. After a while it was noted that the Funet NTP servers used in the 
whole Cybergame were not working. A new NTP server had to be configured 
into the ADC. Luckily a new stratum 1 Symmetricom NTP server was just 
implemented into the laboratory in project lessons. The Funet addresses were 
replaced from the ADC’s NTP configuration tab with the address of the new 
NTP server. 
 
6.2 Creating the required virtual machines 
After finding out the current state of the cybergame.fi site, it was seen that to 
test some of the features a new testing application was to be created. For 
example, there was no working login page on the current Cybergame site and 
to test the brute force blocking feature of the ADC one was required. 
WordPress was chosen for the application, because it is relatively easy to 
implement and contains required features for the testing application. The 
WordPress was installed into a Debian GNU/Linux operating system. As the 
Cybergame network was at the time not connected to the Internet, the 
installation of the operating system and the WordPress had to be done locally. 
The Debian was installed on a local VMWare workstation and the required 
LAMP package and updates were installed. The WordPress was also 
downloaded into a directory, but not yet installed. The Virtual machine was 
then uploaded in the Cybergame VMWare ESXi server and placed into the 
frontend VLAN, where the cybergame.fi site was also located. After the server 
was added to the frontend the WordPress was extracted and installed on the 
server. A local IP-address from the frontend VLAN was added to the eth0 
interface and a virtual server was created for the site from the ADC. After that, 
an address from the “INTERNET” pool of the ADC was added for the site. The 
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INTERNET address pool includes some public addresses assigned to the 
CyberLab, but as the whole CyberLab was not connected to the Internet they 
could be used without harm. The site was then accessible from the address 
193.167.58.249. 
To test the implemented security settings a Kali Linux virtual machine was 
also required. The Kali Linux was installed as a local installation. The Kali was 
set to use the network card of the local computer, because it needed to 
connect to the Cybergame network from the “public” side and not from the 
“inside”. The updates were the only change done to the Kali at this time, as 
they were required to install open-vm-tools and new security testing tools. The 
address of the new testing site was confirmed accessible from the Kali, which 
meant that security testing could be done. 
 
6.3 Configuring security 
The Configuring of the web security settings was the main part of this thesis. 
The configuration of the security part includes the configuration of security 
features that could be usable with the Cybergame application. The security 
settings were configured using the template site located at www.cybergame.fi 
and the WordPress test site created earlier. The Application layer security 
settings used were offered by the ASM module and the basic layer 3-4 
protection settings were featured by the AFM module. 
 
6.3.1 Application security policy 
The ASM application security policy offered the basic defense against the 
application vulnerabilities and attacks. As the application security policy uses 
signatures as one of the mitigation methods the signatures had to be up to 
date. The BIG-IP system comes default with many application attack 
signatures and more are coming as updates every now and then. As the 
signatures could be important to application security, the signature updates 
were made automatic so that the device always has the newest signatures. 
The update frequency settings could be found by navigating to Security > 
Options > Application Security > Attack Signatures. On top of the screen, 
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there was a selection for Scheduled or Manual update mode. The mode was 
changed to Scheduled. One step below the mode selection is the update 
interval menu, which could be set to daily, weekly or monthly. The update 
interval was set to a daily frequency. Few steps below the interval setup was a 
checkbox for auto applying new signature configurations after an update, 
which was also checked. On the very bottom of the screen, the status for the 
update attempts could be seen. The system would now check and apply new 
updates daily. A successful update with signature details can be seen in figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2. Successful update with signature details. 
 
Before the implementation of an application security policy, to log application 
security events, a logging profile with application security logging enabled had 
to be created. The logging profile was created by going to Security > Event 
Logs > Logging Profiles and clicking new. All of the checkboxes, except for the 
network firewall were checked. The log profile was then enabled from the 
virtual server’s security policies setting menu. After the logging was enabled, a 
new application security policy was created. The creation of security policy 
was also required for many of the ASM application security features. By 
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navigating to Security > Application Security > Security Policies and clicking 
the create button a new policy was created. The association of a policy 
required a working virtual server with basic configurations such as addressing 
done. The associated virtual server had also to have an HTTP profile set and 
could not be associated with a Local Traffic policy. Two security policies were 
done, one for the Cybergame virtual server and one for the WordPress site for 
testing. However, the policies did not differ much from each other. From the 
scenario selection, Existing virtual server was chosen. On the next screen a 
selection for the protocol used and the virtual server could be seen. In the 
case of the Cybergame server the HTTPS only protocol was chosen, as 
Cybergame only works on HTTPS and for the WordPress test site the regular 
HTTP was selected. On the next page, there were four choices for building the 
security policy. The choices were automatic, manual or with templates, policy 
for XML and web services manually and the creation of policy by using a third-
party tool. The automatic policy creation was chosen to test the application 
security policy creation. It is possible to edit the policy manually after it has 
been implemented. After selecting the automatic creation more policy settings 
were asked. From the Application Language list, Auto detect was selected. On 
the next screen, the attack signatures could be selected. There are three 
different categories of signatures ready selected which are General Database, 
System Independent and Various Systems. More needed signatures can and 
should be added later when more about the Cybergame system is known. As 
for the WordPress site, the used services were known so MySQL, Apache and 
PHP signatures could be selected. The configuration of automatic policy 
building was next. There were three levels of policy building to select. 
Fundamental is the most basic one, Enhanced is the middle ground and 
Comprehensive is the one with most policies. The learning speed of the policy 
could also be adjusted from the menu. The faster the learning speed, the 
bigger the chance to add false entities. The comprehensive policy type was 
selected because it gives the most features. The policy builder speed was set 
to the fast level. To speed up the learning of the policy, some trusted 
addresses of clients were added to the settings of the security policy, as the 
policy learns faster from the trusted traffic. For the future Cybergame 
application a building type should be chosen, depending on the needed 
elements and the extent of the policy. According to F5 the use of the default 
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policy building settings is suggested and the basic settings are sufficient for 
most applications, as they also require less work. (F5 2014b).  
  
Figure 3. Automatic Policy builder progression. 
 
After all the settings were selected the policy builder went to the status page, 
which is seen in figure 3, it shows the current learned policy elements and the 
general progress of the policy creation. As the policy learns from the traffic of 
the application, the progress bar will not go to the end until the policy has 
collected enough traffic. The settings were saved by clicking the apply policy 
from the top right corner. As the policy was associated with a virtual server, all 
the web application traffic in the virtual server will be examined by the ASM 
and used for the policy building (F5 2014b). The status page of the policy 
builder could be found by going to Security > Application Security > Policy 
Building > Status (Automatic). The learned elements that were chosen in the 
policy building level selection could also be observed from the status page. 
The page also shows the amount of traffic certain elements on the website 
have gotten. For example, the parameters and the traffic for the WordPress 
can be seen in figure 4.  
  
Figure 4. Parameters and traffic in the security policy. 
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When the policy creation has gotten enough traffic to learn all the needed 
policy elements for the application, the signatures were taken out of staging 
state. In the staging mode, the signatures are applied to the application traffic, 
but the blocking flag is not applied to the requests that trigger the events (F5 
2014b). That was done by navigating to Security > Application Security > 
Attack Signatures > Attack Signature Configuration and unchecking the 
Signature Staging box. The signatures and other elements that were ready to 
be enforced could also be studied and enforced at Security > Application 
Security > Policy Building > Enforcement Readiness, as seen on figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Enforcement readiness of the policy elements. 
 
When enough traffic was given to certain objects on the site, the system listed 
all the learned parameters and URLs of the site. The page could be, for 
example, viewed in a tree mode to easily see what URLs and parameters the 
ASM policy had learned. The tree view of the Cybergame.fi can be seen in 
figure 6. 
  
Figure 6. ASM tree view. 
 
The ASM policy also needed to be synced into the other device in the Sync-
Failover device group as the other configurations are. By going to Security > 
Options > Application Security > Synchronization and selecting the right 
failover group from the list, the system synced the ASM configurations in 
similar way as it did to other configurations as shown in figure 7. 
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Figure 7. ASM sync. 
 
When the ASM policy was set to active and started noticing violations, it would 
report them to the event logs. The violations list in the policy’s “blocking” 
section determined how the system would process the triggered violations. 
The blocking section could be found by going to Security > Application 
Security > Blocking. The enforcement mode of the Violations List could be 
either set to transparent or blocking mode. In the blocking mode, the violations 
would be reported to logs and blocked. In the transparent mode, the traffic 
wouldn’t be blocked even if it causes violations, which is why the transparent 
mode was suggested to be used when creating an application security policy. 
To test the violations, the enforcement mode was set to blocking mode. The 
blocking section also included a large list of different violations. There were six 
different violations categories, which include RFC, Access, Length, Input, 
Cookie and Negative security violations. Each violation could be configured 
with three different flags. The learn flag allowed the system to log the illegal 
request and create a learning suggestion of it. The alarm flag logged the 
request and alarms about the request. In the blocking mode, the violation was 
logged and blocked, the enforcement mode had to be set to blocking mode for 
the block flag to work. The violations list gave more information about the 
violations when the “i” icon next to a violation was clicked. 
When the WordPress site’s policy was ready, it was tested. To test the 
violations, some flags were set manually to the violations list. The violations 
found by the system could be observed from Security > Application > 
Requests. Both illegal and legal requests could be viewed from the logs 
depending on the log configurations. Vulnerability on an application was also 
needed to test ASM policy’s ability to defend against application vulnerability 
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exploits. A program called WPScan was ran from the Kali Linux virtual 
machine to determine if WordPress had any vulnerabilities to exploit. The 
following command was written to the Kali terminal to scan the WordPress site 
for vulnerabilities. 
wpscan -u 193.167.58.249 
The installed version of WordPress had a few vulnerabilities including some 
XSS vulnerabilities, of which one was chosen. According to Montpas, the 
vulnerability is included in the WordPress’ youtube embed shortcode and it 
allowed attackers to deface posts on sites and store malicious JavaScript in 
them (Montpas 2017). The following code was then entered to WordPress site 
as a post from an administrator user. 
[embed 
src=’https://youtube.com/embed/12345\x3csvgonload=alert(1)\x3
e’][/embed] 
(Montpas 2017). 
When the code was posted, the results could be instantly seen form the 
ADC’s logs. The policy found many violations from the HTTP request, of which 
one was Attack signature detected. The blocked request is shown in figure 8. 
If a client is blocked by the ASM policy, the following message as in figure 9 
will appear on the web browser of the client. 
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Figure 1. ASM request violation details. 
 
 
Figure 2. ASM error message shown to the client. 
 
When the detected Attack signature was looked closer, it was seen that there 
are three signatures found on the XSS code posted to WordPress. The 
signatures can be seen in figure 10. The violations and details of the attack 
signatures could also be observed in more detail as can be seen from figure 
11. From the outcome, it could be determined that the application security 
policy could be used to mitigate application vulnerabilities and exploits, such 
as XSS and other attacks that were listed in the OWASP top 10 automatically. 
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Figure 3. Attack signatures found. 
 
 
Figure 4. Details on the signatures. 
 
The combination of BIG-IP application security policy and the guacamole 
application had also to be tested, as the Guacamole will be in an important 
part in the Cybergame. Cybergame’s ESXi hypervisor contained an early 
version of a Kali Linux virtual machine that could be used in the NEST. The 
virtual machine was chosen for the testing. The settings of the virtual machine 
were configured so that its traffic would go through the ADC’s NEST virtual 
server and it would appear as a public IP address as was done in the virtual 
machine creation chapter earlier. As the Guacamole uses the port 8080 by 
default, an iRule that redirects traffic to the port 8080 had to be added to the 
NEST’s virtual server on the ADC. The virtual machine was then available 
from IP-address 193.167.58.247. To access the virtual machine using 
Guacamole, “/guacamole” had to be entered after the address. After entering 
to the virtual machine, the machine worked well even though it was somewhat 
slow. The cause of the slowness could have been the old version of the virtual 
machine or because of the traffic going through the ADC. Next was the 
automatic creation of application security policy using the policy builder. It was 
done the same way as earlier in this chapter. When the policy builder was set 
on and traffic was sent to the Guacamole, the policy started learning 
elements. The learning of the Guacamole’s elements went on well except for 
the parameters section, which started showing some odd values. After a few 
clicks on the Guacamole virtual machine, the parameter learning logs had 
large amounts of the values. Some research had to be done, because it 
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seemed that the policy builder was not working right. The values can be seen 
in figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Example of The Guacamole protocol values and the amounts. 
 
After studying the Guacamole documentation, it was found that the values 
were Guacamole protocol instruction messages. The messages are send from 
the client to server and from server to client. (Apache s.a.a.) For example the 
key values that can be seen in figure 12, are sent every time a key is pressed 
or released in the Guacamole virtual machine (Apache s.a.b). At the current 
state, the automatic security policy creation can’t be used with the Cybergame 
Guacamole virtual machines. The combination of Guacamole and application 
security policy need to be studied more. 
 
6.3.2 Anomaly based detection  
The AFM module offers automatic mitigations of layer 4 DoS attacks, however 
against layer 7 DoS attacks some more advanced mitigation methods were 
needed. The Anomaly based detection, which was featured by ASM could be 
implemented against layer 7 attacks. The anomaly based detection is 
essential against for example HTTP-GET attacks. The anomaly based 
detection could be configured against TPS based anomalies and the latency 
based anomalies. The TPS based anomaly was meant for the client side and 
the latency based anomaly for the server side protection. The DoS protection 
could be set to either transparent or blocking mode. The DoS protection 
settings could be found by going to Security > DoS protection. In the DoS 
protection tab, the create button was clicked and the new profile was named. 
 30 
 
Next the application security check box was selected and more options 
appeared. The TPS-based anomaly was set to the blocking operation mode 
and all the prevention policies were checked. The TPS values and the 
prevention duration were left to default. The TPS-based anomaly configuration 
is shown in figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. TPS-based anomaly configuration. 
 
The TPS-based detection would now calculate the average TPS values and 
look for anomalies. After the TPS-based detection, the latency-based 
detection was to be implemented. The operation mode was again set to the 
blocking mode. The detection criteria were set to default settings and all the 
prevention policies were checked. The TPS criteria and the prevention 
settings were again left to default. The settings for the latency-based detection 
can be observed from figure 14. The latency-based detection would now look 
for anomalies in URL-latency, minutely and hourly. 
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Figure 5. Latency based anomaly configuration. 
 
In the settings there was also feature called Heavy URL Protection and under 
that Automatic detection, which both were checked. Heavy URLs can also be 
added to the protection list or a whitelist of the DoS profile manually when 
some of them are known. Lastly the DoS profile was set to record traffic during 
attacks by checking the checkbox form the end of the page. The DoS profile 
was then saved by clicking the update button and was implemented into a 
virtual server. The right virtual server settings were opened, then from the 
security menu the policies tab was opened. Using the advanced configuration 
mode, the DoS protection profile was enabled and the created profile was 
associated with the virtual server. The statistics for the DoS protection profile 
could be found by navigating to Security > Event Logs or Reporting > DoS > 
Application. The anomaly based detection should now block and report 
anomalies it notices in the network traffic to the logs. 
To test the anomaly based detection, a layer 7 DoS tool was used. A tool 
named slowhttptest was chosen for the process. The tool was downloaded for 
the Kali Linux from the APT-repositories. The tool could be used by simply 
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typing slowhttptest to the Linux terminal and then adding parameters. The 
slowhttptest tool had four different attack modes to be used, which could be 
changed with lettered parameters. “-H” mode is for slow headers also known 
as Slowloris, “-B” mode for slow body attack, “-R” for range attack and –X for 
slow read. According to F5 the ASM anomaly detection should be able to 
recognize all of the above except for the Slowloris, which will be analyzed later 
in the work (Holmes 2012). The three mitigatable attacks were tested by using 
command: 
slowhttptest –R –c 5000 –u http://193.167.58.249 
The first letter after the “slowhttptest” determines the mode, the –c defines the 
amount of connections used and after the –u the tested URL should be added. 
Other parameters could also be added, but they were not necessary for these 
tests. After doing some testing with the command a problem was noted. The 
anomaly based detection did not notice the attacks, even though the site went 
down with some of the modes used. Following the testing, the TPS and the 
latency values for the detection of the DoS attacks had to be taken down by a 
very big margin for both the TPS and latency based detection from the 
settings of the DoS profile. After modifying the profiles, the tests were done 
again. The results popped instantly into the application DoS logs, which show 
the starting and ending times of the attacks and the detection method used. 
The results can be seen in figure 15. When the anomaly based detection is 
implemented into the real Cybergame application, the profiles should be tuned 
again for the profiles to correspond the traffic of the site. 
 
Figure 15. ASM anomaly detection logs. 
 
6.3.3 Web scraping 
There were a few available features offered by the ASM module to counter 
malicious bots. According to F5 the caching should be disabled when 
mitigating web scraping bots, as the cached content won’t be protected from 
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the bots. The clients that use the application need also to have JavaScript 
enabled and support cookies for the anomaly detection to work. (F5 2014b). 
At first basic bot detection was implemented by going to Security > Application 
Security > Anomaly Detection > Web Scraping. The system could be set to 
alarm or alarm and block the bots in case of malicious bots appearing. The 
alarm setting was chosen in all cases. When the Bot Detection was enabled, 
some selections appeared at the bottom of the screen. The settings were left 
to default. The bot detection setting determines if the client is a human or a 
bot by limiting the page changes allowed during a certain time as seen in 
figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Bot Detection settings.  
 
The implementation of web scraping based on session opening was next. The 
session opening anomaly detection will detect sessions or IP addresses that 
open too many sessions. Attacks can also be detected when inconsistencies 
and session resets reach a configured threshold. (F5 2014b.) More settings 
appeared on the Session Opening tab at the bottom of the screen. Session 
Opening Anomaly box was checked. From the prevention policy setting below 
Client Side Integrity Defence and Rate Limiting were enabled. Drop IP 
Addresses with bad reputation could not be enabled, because the IP Address 
intelligence module was not licensed. The Session detection criteria were left 
to default, as shown in figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Session Opening Anomaly settings. 
 
 
Figure 18. Session Transaction Anomaly settings. 
 
The last option from the top Session Transaction Anomaly looks for sessions 
that request too much traffic compared to the average amount of the 
application. The traffic is based on TPS. (F5 2014b.) The session transaction 
anomaly settings are shown in figure 18. After the settings were set, the save 
and apply policy buttons were clicked. The default criteria were left in the 
settings. The detection criteria could be tuned later to decrease the chance of 
false bot detections or to increase the chance of detecting bots. The web 
scraping event logs could be seen by navigating to Security > Event Logs > 
Application > Web Scraping Statistics. The system should now alarm in case it 
detects bot activity that have not been whitelisted in the site. The web 
scraping option could not be tested as the CyberLab was not connected to the 
public Internet. In theory, the web scraping should work, but the percent and 
transaction options should be tuned, as in other anomaly based detection 
methods. 
 
6.3.4 Brute force  
The brute force attacks could also be blocked and detected on the ADC 
instead of using some software blockers. To use the ASM brute force blocking 
feature, a setup of a login page was required to be added to the ADC. Login 
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page could be set to the ADC by going to Security > Application Security > 
Login Pages and clicking create new. To set the login page the URL of the 
login page, the authentication method and some parameters needed to be 
known. At least one access validation method was also mandatory. The 
authentication type in the case of the WordPress test site was “HTML Form” 
and the username and the password parameters, which could be found from 
the site source-code were “log” for the username and “pwd” for the password. 
To find some validation settings from the responses “Response Logging” had 
to be activated. After it was activated a regular login and a failed login were 
sent to the site. If the application security policy and the login page were set 
correctly the requests should appear into the log of the application security 
policy. When the response logging was enabled, the HTTP response could be 
viewed and some access validation settings were deducted from the 
responses as seen in figure 19, which shows a response of a successful login. 
 
Figure 19. HTTP Response shown by ASM. 
 
The successful login returned a 302 response and added a 
“wordpress_logged_in” cookie, which were both added to the login page 
settings. From the failed login the response “ERROR” could also be seen. 
This was added to the string that should not appear section as shown in. After 
the login page was completed, the brute force detection could be set up. The 
brute force anomaly detection setting could be found from Security > 
Application Security > Brute Force Attack Prevention. The login page created 
earlier was selected as the login page. The login attempt parameters on both 
session-based and dynamic brute force protection were set to lower to test the 
protection and block durations were also decreased. The complete settings 
can be observed in figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Brute Force Block settings. 
 
To test whether the brute force block was working or not, a brute forcing tool 
was needed. A tool called WPScan was found in the Kali Linux, which is a tool 
exclusively for brute forcing into WordPress. The following command was 
entered to terminal. 
wpscan --url 193.167.58.249 –wordlist /usr/share/john/password.lst --
username root 
The command would brute force the WordPress with the username “root” 
using a wordlist called password.lst, which is an over 3000 word wordlist, 
included with the Kali Linux. The command was run first without the brute 
force blocking on and the whole list was brute forced without a notice in under 
a minute. When the command was run with the blocking set on, WPScan 
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started showing errors as soon as the ADC noticed the brute force attack. 
Based on the settings the attack could be discovered by the Application 
security policy or the Dynamic Anomaly detection method. If the attack was 
discovered by the security policy, the log could be found in the application 
security event logs as shown in figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. ASM brute force request details. 
 
If the application security policy did not detect the brute force, the anomaly 
based dynamic detection would trigger if it was set on. The anomaly detection 
logs could be found from the Event Logs > Application > Brute Force Attacks 
and they would display more information about the attack and how it was 
discovered, as shown in figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Brute force block logs. 
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6.3.5 Session tracking 
With the login page created in the previous chapter, a feature called session 
tracking of the ASM could also be enabled. The session tracking can be used 
to track, enforce and report users, sessions and IP addresses. When the 
session tracking detects a violation, it will perform either logging or blocking 
actions based on a user, session and IP. The session tracking could be 
configured by going to Security > Application Security > Sessions and Logins 
> Session tracking. From top of the menu a login page had to be selected. In 
this case, the WordPress login page was used. Other settings on the top of 
the page were left to default. At the bottom of the menu there were three tabs, 
from which the different session tracking variations could be configured. The 
different features were called block all, log all requests and delay blocking. 
Only the logging setting was tested as the blocking features required other 
configurations. The settings on the log all requests tab had to be re configured 
as the amount of violations by default was too high. All of the violation 
parameters were set to one to as seen in figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Session tracking log all requests. 
 
The system should now after one violation log everything a user, session and 
IP-address does during 600 seconds. After the configuration two different 
WordPress users from different IP-addresses performed one violation 
determined on the application security policy on the WordPress site. The 
sessions should now be logged and found at Security > Reporting > 
Application > Session Tracking Status. In the logs, there were two values for 
usernames, sessions and IP-addresses, which confirmed the session tracking 
and the login page were configured correctly. The session tracking logs can 
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be seen in figure 24. By clicking the “View Requests” button on the logs, the 
requests made by the client could be tracked. 
 
Figure 24. Session tracking logs. 
 
6.3.6 Mitigating specific attacks 
According to Holmes most of the typical DoS attack tools in layers 2 to 7 can 
be blocked with the combination of ASM and AFM. However, there are some 
exceptions that have to be mitigated using other methods. The exceptions are 
SSL Renegotiation attack and Slowloris. (Holmes 2012.) The two attacks 
listed on the article were already tested in a related project on a virtual version 
of the BIG-IP so it would be interesting to see how the attacks work against 
the real BIG-IP devices. 
As the Cybergame will be using HTTPS the SSL renegotiation attack should 
be mitigated. To test if the SSL renegotiation attacks were still a problem 
against BIG-IP and SSL, “THC SSL DOS” tool had to be used. The tool was 
provided by the Kali Linux and could be easily be used from the terminal. The 
following command was entered to the terminal of Kali: 
 thc-ssl-dos 193.167.58.246 443 –accept 
The program only needed the IP-address and HTTPS ports of the target and 
asked in the end to confirm with –accept that the target was applicable to test 
on. When the command was entered, the handshakes went on for some time 
until errors started pouring in. The THC SSL tool progress can be seen in 
figure 25. 
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Figure 25. THC DDoS tool. 
 
 
Figure 26. SSL renegotiation in security logs. 
 
After looking into the logs of the BIG-IP it was found that the something had 
spotted DoS automatically and rate limited the attack as shown in figure 26. 
According to the BIG-IP system performance logs the attack from one client 
only caused the system CPU usage to go up by a few percent so other 
mitigation methods were not necessary. Looking around the F5 site for a 
reason why the attack was mitigated automatically, only information about the 
iRule mitigation was found and nothing stating an automatic mitigation was 
found. After a while a F5 white paper document was found, which states that 
the SSL renegotiation was added to an automatic LTM SSL stack that 
provides the mitigation by default (F5 2014c). 
To test the mitigation against Slowloris, a tool called slowhttptest was used. 
According to F5 the attack was mitigated automatically if an HTTP profile is 
used on a virtual server. The attack sends requests, which are never meant to 
complete to exhaust the connections of a server. If an HTTP profile is set to 
the BIG-IP, the attack will only consume connections on the BIG-IP instead of 
the application servers. When the size of the sent headers exceeds the limit 
set in the BIG-IP HTTP profile, the connection will reset and the device will 
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recover TCP sockets and remove connections from the connection table, 
rendering the Slowloris attack useless. (F5 2017.) When the attack was tested 
on the testing site using slowhttptest tool the statistics page on the BIG-IP 
showed a small increase in processor usage and an increased amount of 
opened connections, but no drawbacks for the site were seen. If the attack 
needs to be mitigated further for some reason, the following iRule could be 
used: 
when CLIENT_ACCEPTED { 
setrtimer 0 
after 1000 { 
if { not $rtimer} { 
drop 
} 
} 
} 
when HTTP_REQUEST { 
setrtimer 1 
} 
(F5 2017). 
 
6.4 Configuring optimization 
Some traffic optimization features were also implemented to the ADC. The 
optimization features are very important to reduce the load and the traffic that 
goes through the ADC to the servers. If the traffic and the content were 
optimized, the saved resources could be for example used to mitigate DoS 
attacks or serve the application to the users. The optimization features were 
featured in the AAM module. 
 
6.4.1 TCP multiplexing 
TCP multiplexing was the first optimization setting to be implemented. TCP 
multiplexing feature could be found in the LTM module of the ADC by the 
name of OneConnect. As stated in the F5 OneConnect tuning document, the 
 42 
 
TCP profiles of the HTTP profile that are going to be implemented with 
OneConnect should be changed first to the F5 default optimized profiles (F5. 
s.a.). First by navigating to Local Traffic > Virtual Servers the configured virtual 
server was selected.  
 
FIGURE 27. The optimized TCP profiles implemented. 
 
Around the TCP section of the virtual server’s settings, the client side TCP 
profile was set to “tcp-wan-optimized” and the server side was set to “tcp-lan-
optimized” as shown in figure 27. Next was the implementation of 
OneConnect. New OneConnect profiles could be created from Local Traffic > 
Profiles > Other > OneConnect. The IP range for reused connections could be 
set from the OneConnect profile settings in the source mask section. 
OneConnect profile with a mask of 0.0.0.0 reuses all the connections and 
could mess up the log entries. The safest mask 255.255.255.255 was chosen, 
because it only reuses the same client’s TCP connections. Other OneConnect 
settings were left to default.  
 
Figure 28. Oneconnect reused TCP connections. 
 
After implementing the OneConnect profile into the virtual server, the reused 
TCP connections could be seen from the ADCs statistics page located at 
Statistics > Module statistics > Local Traffic > Profiles summary > 
OneConnect. After a couple of refreshes on the www.cybergame.fi site the 
statistics page showed that the TCP is multiplexed correctly as shown in figure 
28.  
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6.4.2 HTTP compression 
HTTP compression is another good way to optimize the traffic and it can be 
done on the ADC instead of the application servers. The profile could be 
created by navigating to Local Traffic > Profiles > Services > HTTP 
Compression and by clicking the create button. The content to be compressed 
or never compressed could be added to the content lists. To test the 
compression, text/, application/http, application/javascript were added to the 
contents list. Other settings were left to default. The content list and other 
settings can be seen in figure 29.  
 
Figure 29. HTTP Compression settings. 
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When implementing compression into the Cybergame virtual server, the 
content should be changed accordingly when more about the compressible 
content of the Cybergame is known. The profile was then added to the virtual 
server of the testing application by navigating to the virtual server tab, 
selecting the right virtual server and scrolling to the bottom of the menu to the 
HTTP compression profile selection. The traffic requested from the server was 
now compressed. The statistics of the compression could be found in 
Statistics > Module Statistics > Local Traffic > Profiles Summary > HTTP 
Compression, which confirmed that the compression was working well on the 
test site as seen in figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. HTTP Compression statistics. 
 
6.4.3 Web Acceleration 
The last optimization feature to be implemented was the Web Acceleration, 
caching of static content. Combined with the HTTP compression the caching 
allows the ADC to cache compressed static content, improving the 
performance. The configuration of the Web Acceleration needs some extra 
tweaking to be done on the device before it can be used, if a BIG-IP ASM 
policy is already implemented into the device. (F5 2015). At first a new custom 
Web Acceleration profile was created, by navigating to Local Traffic > Profiles 
> Services and selecting web acceleration. For the parent profile of the new 
profile, “optimized-caching” was selected. Only a few settings were changed 
from the default. The minimum object size, which was set to 1 byte and the 
maximum object size which was set to 150000 bytes. The cache size was 
changed to 100 megabytes for this implementation. To save the profile, finish 
was then clicked. For the ASM and the acceleration profile to work together, a 
new local traffic policy had to be made. By navigating to Local Traffic > 
Policies and clicking create, a new local traffic policy was created. The new 
policy was named “ASM_cache_static_content”. The strategy setting selection 
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was changed to first match. In the Requires setting option the http was moved 
from available to selected and from the Controls section both, asm and 
caching were moved. The changes were saved by clicking finished and the 
basic settings for the policy were now in place as shown in figure 31. 
  
Figure 31. ASM web acceleration policy general properties. 
 
In the Rules section of the panel, the add button was clicked to create rules for 
the policy. The first rule was named “Default_ASM_No_Cache”. In the Actions 
section of the rule, the following settings were added: 
Target: asm 
Event: request 
Action: enable 
Value: /Common/testsite_3 
The policy will enable ASM policy called testsite_3 to the virtual server it is 
added. Before going any further, the policy should now be added to a virtual 
server. This should also be done before building a security policy with the 
policy builder or manually. Some recommended practices could also be done 
to the policy at this point, like changing the file types and URLS in the policy to 
wildcard and enabling blocking for certain violations. (F5 2015.) By going to 
Local Traffic > Virtual Servers, selecting the configured virtual server and 
clicking the resources tab the Policies section could be found. In the policies 
section Manage was clicked and the recently made 
“ASM_Cache_Static_Content” policy was enabled. After that the web 
acceleration profile that was made first, was added to the virtual server, by 
going to the settings of the virtual server. By navigating again to the policies 
section and selecting the policy that was made earlier, the policy could be re-
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edited. The “cache_disable” rule was opened again and the following was 
added: 
Target: cache 
Event: request 
Action: disable 
Add was then clicked and the rule was updated. Next the rule for the caching 
to be was made. By clicking add button a new rule was added to the policy. 
The new rule was named “cache_enable”. The following Conditions were 
added to the rule: 
Operand: http-uri 
Event: request 
Selector: extension 
Condition: equals 
The case sensitive box around the equals was also cleared. In the value 
setting next to the equals, some static content to be cached, should be added. 
JPG, PNG and CSS were added to the value list. The same lines to enabe the 
ASM policy as in the cache disable rule were added to the action section of 
the cache enabled rule. The actions for enabling the caching were then added 
to the actions section by adding the following values:  
Target: cache 
Event: request 
Action: enable 
On the policies list two rules could now be seen, like shown in figure 32. One 
of them disables the ASM cache and the another enables the ASM cache with 
the implemented file types. To determine the state of the policy the rules could 
be reordered in the rules menu of the policy. If the “cache_disable” rule was 
set on the top, the ASM cache wouldn’t be enabled. According to F5 the ASM 
cache should not be enabled before the application security policy building is 
finished and enabled on the virtual server (F5 2015). If the configuration was 
done correctly, the web acceleration profile should be able to serve ASM 
validated content from the cache, allowing ASM to focus on the dynamic 
content.  
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Figure 32. Caching policy rules. 
 
After the building of the application security policy was finished the cache was 
set to the enable state from the policy list. Some static content such as images 
were added to the WordPress test website. After a while, the Web 
Acceleration profile statistics started showing hits. The statistics for the Web 
Acceleration profile can be found by going to Statistics > Module Statistics > 
Local Traffic and selecting Virtual Servers from the drop-down menu and 
clicking “view…” button on the selected virtual server. From the statistics 
page, it could be seen that the web acceleration found content from the web 
page and cached the static content described in the policy created above. The 
statistics page can be observed in figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. Caching statistics. 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
The project was finished without any major failures or setbacks and can be 
seen as a success. With the features used in the project, the Cybergame 
application will have a secure and optimized framework waiting for the 
application to be finished. Some of the implementations created in this project 
can be used as they are, but it is still advised to re-configure the features 
when the creation of the Cybergame application is finished. The 
documentation included in this project should help with the process of 
configuring the features. 
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Most of the security and optimization features that could be usable in the 
Cybergame application were studied in this project. However, on some of the 
configured features only the basics things were scratched. That is mostly, 
because an application is required to have the configurations make any 
sense. For example, it is not possible to create an application security policy 
for an application that doesn’t exist or by using another application.  
As a result of the thesis work, lots of new things were learned. The knowledge 
of F5 ADCs went from zero to some level of expertise, because of the many 
hours used to configure the device and to read the F5 documentations. The 
configuration of the ADC features, taught a lot of new things about features 
that were never even heard of before this project. The importance and value 
of the web application security and optimization in the Cybergame and in 
general was noted, as they are key factors in application delivery. With some 
good planning and time management the progress of the work could have 
been smoother. The F5 documentation could have been used more from the 
start, since some of the implementations had to be done multiple times 
because of not reading the documentations well enough. 
In future projects, the features studied in this work should be implemented into 
the Cybergame application, when the application is ready. Most of the 
features in this project could also be studied and implemented further when 
the requirements set by the Cybergame application are known. Features that 
include the anomaly based detection settings in the security section can be 
tuned better when the typical network traffic behavior is known. The 
optimization features could also be tuned to see on which kind of a setup they 
provide the most optimized traffic. The combination of application security 
policy and the Guacamole virtual machines needs to be researched more to 
implement application security into the Guacamole. 
When implementing the features into the Cybergame application the most 
important setting, the application security policy should be done first as some 
of the other features require the security policy to be complete. Using the 
automatic policy builder, the application should be taught to the ADC by a few 
clients using the trusted addresses as explained in the application security 
chapter. When the policy is finished, it will need to be monitored for possible 
false entities and that it is working correctly. The violation settings of the 
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policy, mentioned in the same chapter should also be tuned to the required 
settings. If the login page of the Cybergame application can be added to the 
ADC, as was done in the brute force chapter, the brute force protection and 
session tracking features can be used. The anomaly based DoS protection 
requires some information on the traffic of the Cybergame network, which 
means the application needs to be online for some time before the correct 
implementation is possible. The web scraping bot protection is the least 
important of the features but it could be worth to implement, if it is possible 
and protection against bots is required. The F5 websites should be studied 
every now and then for information and mitigation methods on new 
vulnerabilities. The implemented optimization features will increase the 
performance of the application. The TCP multiplexing and HTTP compression 
increase the performance even on default settings. When implementing 
caching with ASM set on, the application security policy should be finished 
and some extra configuration is also needed as done in the web acceleration 
chapter. All of the optimization features can be optimized when more about 
the application and traffic is known. 
 
  
 50 
 
REFERENCES 
A10. 2016. SSL Offloading. Available at: 
https://www.a10networks.com/resources/glossary/ssl-offload [Accessed 9 
December 2016]. 
Apache. s.a.a. Appendix B. Guacamole protocol reference 
https://guacamole.incubator.apache.org/doc/gug/protocol-reference.html 
[Accessed 27 April 2017]. 
Apache. s.a.b. Chapter 14. The Guacamole protocol. Available at: 
https://guacamole.incubator.apache.org/doc/gug/guacamole-protocol.html 
[Accessed 27 April 2017]. 
Balandin, S. Andreev, S.& Koucheryavy, Y. 2015. Internet of Things, Smart 
Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems. Springer. 
Citrix. 2016 What is an Application Delivery Controller (ADC)?. Available 
at:https://www.citrix.fi/products/netscaler-adc/resources/what-is-an-adc.html 
[Accessed 10 December 2016]. 
Crunchbase. 2016. F5 Networks. Available at: 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/f5-networks [Accessed 29 
November 2016]. 
F5. 2013. Preventing DoS Attacks for Layer 7 traffic. Available at: 
https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/products/big-ip_asm/manuals/product/asm-
implementations-11-4-0/18.html [Accessed 1 February 2017]. 
F5. 2014a. BIG-IP Application Acceleration Manager. Available at: 
https://www.f5.com/pdf/products/big-ip-application-acceleration-manager-
datasheet.pdf [Accessed 7 April 2017]. 
F5. 2014b. BIG-IP Application Security Manager: Implementations. Available 
at: https://support.f5.com/content/kb/en-us/products/big-
ip_asm/manuals/product/asm-implementations-11-5-
0/_jcr_content/pdfAttach/download/file.res/BIG-
IP_Application_Security_Manager__Implementations.pdf [Accessed 8 
February 2017]. 
F5. 2014c. The SSL Reference Architechture. Available at: 
https://f5.com/resources/white-papers/the-f5-ssl-reference-architecture 
[Accessed 13 April 2017]. 
F5. 2015. Configuring a Web Acceleration profile for use with a BIG-IP ASM-
enabled virtual server. Available at: https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K16565 
[Accessed 1 February 2017]. 
F5. 2016a. Advanced Firewall Manager. Available at: 
https://f5.com/products/big-ip/advanced-firewall-manager-afm [Accessed 9 
January 2017]. 
F5. 2016b. Application Delivery Controller. Available at: 
https://f5.com/glossary/application-delivery-controller [Accessed 29 November 
2016]. 
 51 
 
F5. 2016c. Modules. Available at: https://f5.com/products/modules [Accessed 
11 December 2016]. 
F5. 2017. K10260: Mitigating Slowloris DoS attacks with the BIG-IP system. 
Available at: https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K10260 [Accessed 22 March 
2017]. 
F5. s.a. Tuning the OneConnect Feature on the BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager. 
Available at: https://www.f5.com/pdf/deployment-guides/oneconnect-tuning-
dg.pdf [Accessed 16 January 2017]. 
Galinina, O. Balandin, S & Koucheryavy, Y. 2016. Internet of Things, Smart 
Spaces, and Next Generation Networks and Systems. Springer. 
Holmes, D. 2012. Mitigating Nuclear DDoSer, R-U-Dead-Yet, Dirt Jumper, 
Keep-Dead, and Tor Hammer with F5. Available at: 
https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/mitigating-nuclear-ddoser-r-u-dead-yet-dirt-
jumper-keep-dead-and-tor-hammer-with-f5 [Accessed 8 March 2017]. 
Holmes, D. 2013. Mitigating DDoS Attacks with F5 Technology. Available at: 
https://f5.com/resources/white-papers/mitigating-ddos-attacks-with-f5-
technology [Accessed 3 January 2017]. 
Imperva 2017. Web Application Security. Available at: 
https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/application-security.html 
[Accessed 21 March 2017]. 
Iveson, S. 2013. An Introduction to F5 Networks LTM iRules. 2nd edition. Lulu 
Press, Inc. 
Jönsson, P. & Iveson, S. 2014. F5 Networks Application Delivery Fundamen-
tals Study Guide. 1st edition. Self-Published. 
Kajova, H. 2016. Datacenter Application Delivery Virtual Laboratory. Available 
at: http://theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/118489/Kajova_Henri.pdf 
[Accessed 24 March 2017]. 
KEMP. 2016. Application Delivery Controllers (ADC) and Server Load 
Balancing. Available at: https://kemptechnologies.com/uk/application-delivery-
controllers [Accessed 10 December 2016]. 
Kiyuna, A. & Conyers, L. 2015. CYBERWARFARE SOURCEBOOK. lulu.com. 
Lerner, A. Skorupa, J. & Ciscato, D. 2016. Magic Quadrant for Application 
Delivery Controllers. Available at: https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-
3GEK4YV&ct=160830&st=sb&aliId=170803803 [Accessed 29 November 
2016]. 
MacVittie, L. 2008. 3 Really good reasons you should use TCP multiplexing. 
Avalable at: https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/3-really-good-reasons-you-
should-use-tcp-multiplexing [Accessed 9 December 2016]. 
Montpas, M. 2017. Stored XSS in WordPress Core. Available at: 
https://blog.sucuri.net/2017/03/stored-xss-in-wordpress-core.html [Accessed 
12 April 2017]. 
 52 
 
Offensive Security. 2017a. Kali Linux Hard Disk Install. Available at: 
http://docs.kali.org/installation/kali-linux-hard-disk-install [Accessed 8 March 
2017]. 
Offensive Security. 2017b. What is Kali Linux. Available at: 
http://docs.kali.org/introduction/what-is-kali-linux [Accessed 16 January 2017]. 
OWASP. 2013. OWASP Top 10 – 2013. Available at: 
https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-
downloads/v2/code.google.com/owasptop10/OWASP%20Top%2010%20-
%202013.pdf [Accessed 15 March 2017]. 
OWASP. 2016. Blocking Brute Force Attacks. Available at 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Blocking_Brute_Force_Attacks [Accessed 
21 February 2017]. 
Peltonen, A. 2016. Application Delivery Controller Implementation to 
CyberLab Data Center. Available at: 
https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/110229/antti_peltonen.pdf 
[Accessed: 12 January 2017]. 
Rouhiainen, K. & Kettunen, M. 2015. Kyberturvallisuutta kehitetään joukolla. 
Available at: http://www2.kyamk.fi/Koskinen/052015/kyber.html [Accessed 17 
December 2016]. 
Saeed, N. H. 2016. Good or Evil? What Web Scraping Bots Mean for Your 
Site. Available at: https://www.incapsula.com/blog/web-scraping-bots.html 
[Accessed 14 February 2017]. 
Shakarian, P. Shakarian, J. & Ruef, A. 2013. Introduction to Cyber-Warfare : A 
Multidisciplinary Approach. Syngress. 
Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. 2014. Euroopan aluekehitysrahaston (EAKR) 
rahoittaman hankkeen kuvaus. Available at: 
https://www.eura2014.fi/rrtiepa/projekti.php?projektikoodi=A70554 [Accessed 
17 December 2016]. 
Wagnon, J. 2013. The BIG-IP Application Security Manager Part 1: What is 
the ASM?.  Available at: https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/the-big-ip-
application-security-manager-part-1-what-is-the-asm [Accessed 24 January 
2017]. 
